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Since the formal establishment of South Korea (hereafter, Korea)-the People’s Republic of China 
(hereafter, China) relations in 1992, the bilateral relationship has recorded tremendous success in 
terms of trade volume, cooperation on the North Korean nuclear crisis, and the magnitude of 
exchanges in various areas. However, it is also true that the bilateral relations still remain far from 
satisfaction in terms of depth and degree of communication, crisis management, and a shared vision. 
Given Korean’s psychological alertness and apprehension formed over a long history of contacts with 
China, differences in political system, mutual misperceptions, and degree of understanding, these 
problems cast serious challenges for future relations between the two countries. In the future, Korea-
China relations could be sour and bumpy if the Korean government relies excessively on security-
oriented approaches, centering on its alliance with the U.S. 
Korea needs to exercise a “creative middle power-pragmatic diplomacy” in dealing with China. 
The objective is to establish a positive-sum game in the Korea-China strategic cooperative partnership, 
extending consultation and cooperation beyond security issues on the Korean Peninsula. Both the 
Korea-U.S. alliance and the Korea-China strategic cooperative partnership should be the foundation 
of Korea’s diplomatic assets, under which Korea would try to persuade North Korea to abandon its 
nuclear program. 
The substance of Korea-China relations will be determined by the policies of each government to 
consolidate the “cooperative strategic partnership.” Sound communication, political will, and 
strategic management matter. The future relationship of Korea with China is at the crossroad among 
the ranges of being enemy, homager, or equal partner. Korea obviously favors the establishment of an 
equal partnership with China, based upon the common principles of mutual respect, cooperation, and 
co-prosperity.   
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Formal state relationship between Korea and China was established on August 24, 1992. 
Since then, the relationship between the two countries has developed very rapidly in various 
areas (Snyder, 2009). In economy area, China has been the most important trading partner 
since 2004 and is likely to maintain the status for the next decade. Korea also became the 
third-largest trading partner to China. As of 2011, the trade volume between the two 
countries exceeded 240 billion U.S. Dollars and is likely to reach 300 billion U.S. Dollars by 
2015 as both countries set the target. Such a breathtakingly rapid development of the Korea-
China relationship can be described as a “miracle of bilateral diplomacy” (Wang, 2007). 
In terms of formal relationship, Korea and China have steadfastly upgraded their 
relationship from a “friendly cooperative relationship” in 1992, “cooperative partnership 
toward 21st century” in 1998, “comprehensive cooperative partnership” in 2003, to a 
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“strategic cooperative partnership” in 2008, which is one of the highest forms of bilateral 
relationship in Chinese foreign policy. 1  Due to the establishment of such strategic 
relationship, Korea and China have been able to discuss North Korea issues in their bilateral 
meetings.  
During the most of the Cold War period, Korea regarded China as an enemy, only 
accepting Taiwan as the legitimate government. China also recognized only North Korea as a 
legitimate state on the Korean Peninsula. However, Korea had gradually expanded its 
contacts with China since China adopted a policy of reform and opening up in 1978. During 
the period of 1980s, Korea had two China policies in practice although it had a one-China 
policy supporting Taiwan in principle. China also maintained its former one-Korea policy 
but in practice recognized Korea as a political entity.  
China officially adopted two Korea policies when it supported both Koreas as UN 
members in 1991 although China was still in favor of North Korea in its psychology and 
strategic interests (Kim, 2003:12). The normalization in 1992 between Korea and China 
meant that Korea accepted China as the only legitimate government representing the whole 
China in principle as well as in practice.  
Under Hu Jintao’s leadership after 2002, China made a very strategic decision adopting a 
balanced policy between the two Koreas in principle. In the process of reevaluating Chinese 
foreign policy, Hu and his foreign policy aids made a decision to transform China-North 
Korea relationship into a normal state-to-state relationship. Although there is no obvious 
evidence to connect North Korea’s pursuit of its nuclear program with the Chinese decision, 
growing isolation of North Korea even from China is likely to be related to North Korea’s 
efforts for nuclear armament. In Chinese perspective, the second nuclear crisis brought North 
Korea to the fore of Chinese foreign policy and strategic concerns. However, it was not 
necessary for North Korea to be its strategic assets but to be a troublemaker. The overall 
trends of relationship between Korea and China have certainly evolved in favor of Korea in 
comparison to North Korea.   
However, it is ironic that China watchers in Korea as well as Korea observers in China 
agree that the level of political trust between the two countries has been at the lowest under 
President Lee Myoung-bak of Korea ever since the establishment of their formal relationship. 
China perceived Lee’s foreign policy as a potential threat to China’s as well as regional 
stability.2 China perceived Lee’s policy to heavily lean towards the U.S. It also viewed Lee’s 
North Korea policy to be based upon the presumption of North Korea’s incoming collapse, 
which threatens China’s strategic interests. The levels of public trust in both countries have 
recently been at the downfalls as well.3  
Given the dramatic increases in trade volume, personnel, social, and cultural exchanges, 
and active cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue, the current atmosphere of tension 
between the two countries is difficult to explain. Such increasing economic and personnel 
exchanges, cooperation, and communication didn’t promote better political relationship 
between the two countries. Why are the bilateral relations more complicated than it appears 
                                                          
1 Regarding details of the forms of Chinese foreign policy, see (Kim, 2009:287-305). 
2 For example, see (Kim, 2008a); (Zhang, 2008). Also author’s various interviews in China.  
3 Northeast Asian History Foundation, Public Opinion Poll on Korea-China Relations (2007-2010). 
Regarding a Survey-based analysis on Korea-China relations, for example, see (Lee, 2012). However, 
it is also noteworthy that due to the difficulties in conducting surveys in China, statistics and data may 
not well reflect realities. Thus, deciphering may be more important than reading the data themselves.    




to be? And is the relationship at the crossroads? As explained, the rise of a conservative party 
in the 2008 Presidential election in Korea might be the source of the problem; however, it 
has much more complex roots, both historically and structurally. This short paper seeks to 
explain the following questions: what factors have affected relationship between the two 
countries? What strategic values do Chinese policy-makers perceive on Koreas? And what 
factors may determine the future relationship between the two countries?  
 
 
2. AMBIVALENCE OF KOREA-CHINA RELATIONS 
 
2.1. Changing Perceptions in between Historical Legacy and Current Experiences 
 
Korean views and emotions towards the Chinese are quite complicated and ambivalent. 
Korean views over China have been formed throughout thousands of years of mutual 
exchanges. Koreans acknowledge that it is their fate to live with China. China is a 
geographical power to Korea; meanwhile, the United States is a geopolitical power. 
Throughout Korean history, China has been responsible for nearly a half of over 930 foreign 
invasions. Therefore, Koreans share a deep sense of apprehension and fear of a strong China. 
Whenever instability rises in China, it has negatively affected lives of Koreans. Koreans 
inevitably apprehend overflowing political influence of China on the Korean peninsula as 
well. It is not difficult to find out that they dared to run the risks of fighting back militarily 
for survival and independence in the past if China excessively sought to extend its influence.   
Before the normalization, Korea obviously regarded China as an ally to North Korea and 
hostile country. However, due to the rapid growth of economic cooperation and personnel 
exchanges, just before the Northeast project emerged as a political-diplomatic problem, 
according to a Dong-a Daily News survey (May 4, 2004), China was considered the most 
popular country with an approval rating of 61% (26% for the United States) (Chung, 
2007a:6-12). During the period, the volume of the trades between the two countries 
dramatically increased from 6.37 billion U.S. dollars in 1992 to 57.0 billion U.S. dollars in 
2003. According to a liberalist axiom that more economic and human exchanges likely 
promote peace, such a development must have strengthened the bilateral relationship 
between Korea and China.    
However, such an optimistic view on Korea-China relations cannot explain why Koreans 
were so alarmed by China’s so-called “Northeast (history) Project (dongbei gongcheng),” 
which dramatically damaged China’s image within Korea. In the immediate aftermath of the 
dispute, Koreans who disapproved of China climbed to 58.2% in an opinion poll by the 
Korean Broadcasting System. Despite considerable efforts by the Chinese government to 
quell the issue, as of 2010, 45.8% of Koreans still held views which were unfavorable to or 
alarmed by China.4  
Recent seemingly-aggressive foreign policy of China toward neighboring countries, 
illustrated in the Cheonan battleship incident and the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands dispute in 
2010, quickly brought a historical image of Chinese arrogance and apprehension incised 
among Koreans. Accordingly, its disapproval rate quickly increased from 34.5% in 2007 to 
45.8% in 2010.5 According to the survey outcome of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 
                                                          
4 Korea Northeast Asian History Foundation, p. 21.  
5 Data from Surveys of Korea Northeast Asian History Foundation (2007-2010). 
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China’s favorability rate also dropped from 4.5 in 2010 to 4.0 in 2012 in the 0~7.0 scales 
(7.0: Full Satisfaction) although the change was not as drastic as in the disapproval rate. The 
results are quite behind to that of the U.S from 5.9 in 2010 to 5.5 in 2012.6   
Korea may be the nation most knowledgeable about and accustomed to China. Let alone 
the experiences of contacts for thousands of years as a geographical neighbor, about 60% of 
HSK examinees in the world are currently Koreans (White Paper of the MOFAT, 2010:294). 
Between Korea-China, there are 830 flights every week, compared to 550 times between 
China-Japan. Public views of Korea on China had dramatically improved since the 
normalization in 1992 until the moment just before the “Northeast (history) Project incident, 
reflecting that Korean economy must have been one of the most beneficiaries of the rapid 
rise of China in the world. However, recent experiences illustrate that views on China are not 
stagnant in Korea and are likely to dramatically change if any conflict incurs.  
Therefore, it is shortsighted to assume that Korea has positive—even unconditionally 
favorable—views towards China.7 Such a view may unconsciously lead to the impetuous 
impression that Korea would eventually fall into the orbit of Chinese empire in the future. 
Recent studies on Sino-North Korea relations also told us that distrust has been deeply rooted 
in the bilateral relations due to lessons from history (Lee, 2000:206-215; Chung and Im, 
2003:235-39).8  Constructivist theory of international relations told us the importance of 
perception socially constructed. Koreans’ views on China have been constructed historically 
as much as socially during a long period of time. Therefore, Korean’s views on China must 
be a mixture of historical memories and experiences and current needs and experiences, 
which are much more complex than appeared on the surface.   
 
2.2. Strengthening Relations in Diplomacy and Security after the Cold War 
 
A Korean China expert, Jae ho Chung, argues that a honeymoon period between Korea 
and China ended with the “garlic dispute” in 2000 (Chung, 2011:262). From the Chinese 
perspective, the financial crisis during the years of 1997~98 disillusioned the myth of Korean 
economic miracles. The bilateral relationship gradually transformed into a normal 
relationship in which both countries placed their priority on economic interests rather than 
special and political consideration. More disputes such as “Garlic battle” in 2000, the 
Northeast Project issues in 2004 and 2007, and the “Kimchi” incident in 2006 occurred. 
Public opinions on China fluctuated over time in Korea, with the recent trends of 
downgrading.        
However, steadfast institutionalization and upgrades reached an unprecedented scope in 
the areas of Summit level of exchanges, formal diplomatic relationship, and governmental 
dialogues in economy, diplomacy, and even security during the period of 2000s. Recently, 
the exchange of top-level visits has been brisk. Beginning with Roh Tae-woo in 1992, 
successive Korean presidents have made official visits to China; Kim Young-sam in 1994, 
Kim Dae-jung in 1998, Roh Moo-hyun in 2003 and 2006. In particular, under Lee’s 
government, there has been 10 summit meetings, and if it includes the meetings with Chinese 
                                                          
6 According to the poll, favorability rate for Japan significantly declined from 4.2 in 2010 to 2.9 in 
2012. See the AIPS monthly poll at http://www.asaninst.org/03_publications/report_detail.php?seq= 
1598&ipage=1&nums=0&ca=1 (2012. 10. 8).  
7 For example, see the argument of (Chung, 2007). 
8 Kim Jung Il’s unfriendly attitude and apprehension of China is also been well-known.  
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Premier Wen Jiabao, both countries held almost four summit level of meetings annually. 
From China, President Jiang Zemin visited Korea in 1995, President Hu Jintao in 2005 and 
in 2012 and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in 2007. 
Favorable atmospheres in bilateral relations reached at the zenith during the Roh Moo-
hyun government. Close consultations between Seoul and Beijing were held concerning the 
North Korean nuclear question and security conditions on the Korean Peninsula and in the 
East Asia region. China closely cooperated with Korea in the six-party talks with recognition 
that Seoul’s “Peace and Prosperity Policy” toward North Korea coincided with its own 
objective of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula under the Roh administration of 
Korea. It was also during these years that a hot line was established between the two 
governments, a rare action in their bilateral security and military relationship given the 
legacy of the Korean War and the strategic importance of North Korea from the Chinese side.  
However, the bilateral relations cooled down under the Lee government. With China 
focusing on stability on the Koran peninsula, Lee government of Korea placed its policy 
priority on denuclearization of North Korea policy, being away from South-North 
rapprochement policy of previous governments. Korea regards the threat of North Korea as 
the most imminent and realistic one as well illustrated in the Yeonpyung incident, North 
Korea bombarding civilian area.   
China’s North Korea experts are inclined to believe that denuclearization is connected to 
the survival of North Korea’s regime after the second nuclear test of North Korea in 2009. 
This kind of perspective understands that even a small yield or diplomatic failure on the 
North Korean side could bring crisis to Kim’s regime.  
China seemed to believe that Seoul’s policies to North Korea aimed at overthrowing 
North Koran regime, which is against its strategic interests. Furthermore, Korea is willing to 
invite the US forces to control China and be a variable in the relationship between the US 
and China as well illustrated in the Cheonan battleship incident. As a result, Chinese unease 
towards the Lee’s government has risen.  
It would be a long and difficult (maybe almost impossible under the current security 
environments) process for North Korea to give up its nuclear capabilities. Once, most 
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Chinese experts believed that nuclear devices of North Korea would be a bargaining chip to 
the US until the second nuclear test in 2009. North Korea would slowly advance through the 
phases of nuclear resolution in order to maximize the amount of compensation. Moreover, 
many Chinese experts thought that the North Korean nuclear resolution had much to do with 
international society’s capability to support North Korea. However, Beijing’s former 
assessment has proven wrong, given North Korean behavior. 
While developing and consolidating its nuclear capabilities, North Korea hopes to receive 
international economic assistance to stabilize its economy and regime. Given the current 
situation, whether North Korea is able to adopt a pacifist way is uncertain and not likely. It is 
more likely to continue and intensify troubles in the future. The only way for them to achieve 
its objectives is to cultivate schism of interests of each member of the other five-parties.  
Surprisingly, China adopted much more active engagement policies toward North Korea 
and has promoted personal exchanges immediately after the second North Korean nuclear 
test. When the Cheonan battleship incident in March, 2010 and the Yeonpyung bombardment 
in November, 2010, occurred, no matter how North Korea behaved, China rigidly stuck to its 
Korea policy priority of stability. This built up an image of China as an irresponsible pro-
North Korea country to the public of Korean public.      
Such different policy priorities naturally lead to frictions and tension between Korea and 
China. In this respect, North Korea has been successful of cultivating priority differences of 
Korea-China, engulfing the schism, forming a new Cold war-like security environment in 
Northeast Asia under which North Korea can harvest fruits most. In the near future, however, 
little hope for policy coordination between Korea and China exists in dealing with North 
Korea problem although coordinated actions among five-parties are the most important in 
resolving the issue.  
The strategic value of Korea to China, with their economic cooperation, may continue to 
be high for a while due to the changing international security environment, in spite of their 
low level of trust and bumpy relations in the recent years. At the regional level, power shift 
between China and Japan is in process, and between the US and China at the global level. 
Such strategic shifts increase Korea’s strategic value to China. Korea can be a “swing state” 
in the eyes of China. If Korea were sided with Japan and the US, China would be likely 
beleaguered and forced to live in a Cold War-like-environment. Korea’s role in maintaining 
stability on the Korean peninsula and Korea’s strategic value in the geopolitics of Northeast 
Asia can’t be neglected.  
At the institutional level, Korea and China elevated their formal relationship from the 
comprehensive cooperative partnership to the strategic cooperative partnership in 2008, 
which is one of the highest levels of relations in Chinese foreign policy. Both countries hold 
strategic dialogues in the areas of foreign affairs and security at the vice-minister level 
respectively as well. Both also enjoy dialogues at various levels quite extensively.  
Both countries agreed in 2012 that they would establish a hot line between Ministries of 
National Defense and also hold a strategic dialogue in security area. In the security area, both 
countries are certainly crossing over the initial level of military cooperation passing over 
military exchanges. 9  They have increased exchanges in military personnel as well as 
organizations at various levels. However, such developments are not likely going beyond the 
initial level of military cooperation unless getting over several obstacles. Crucial variables in 
                                                          
9 For the status of Korea-China military cooperation, see (Kim, 2003b:72-77); (Hwang, 2007); (Kim, 
2012b). 




the relationship in the future are Korea-China relations, development of Sino-North Korea 
relations, uncertainty of future orientation of Chinese military development, unhealthy 
development of Sino-U.S. relations, orientation of Korea-U.S. alliance toward China, and 
overall security environments in East Asia. Throughout recent experiences, it became 
obvious that North Korea as well as the U.S factor would be crucial for Korea-China 
relations in diplomacy and security area in spite of various positive factors between them. 
Both countries are not independent from these variables in developing their relationship.  
 
 
3. CHINA’S KOREA POLICY 
 
3.1. Relative Importance of Variables 
 
Over time, relative importance of variables in the making of China’s Korea policies has 
changed. During the Jiang Zemin era (1989-2002), factors that once positively affected Sino-
North Korean relations have turned into liabilities. 10  The modifications of China’s own 
development strategy gave rise to changes in China’s understanding and evaluation of North 
Korea. China’s international isolation due to the Tiananmen incident in 1989 facilitated the 
formalization of diplomatic relations with Korea in 1992, despite North Korea’s opposition.11 
China’s policy priority in foreign affairs was overcoming international isolation and 
receiving aid for economic development.12 Korea’s strategic value came to outweigh that of 
North Korea for the first time in the trilateral relations.  
The North Korean leader, Kim Il sung’s sudden death in 1994 also meant the end of old 
comradeship based upon personal affinity among China-North Korean leaders. From the 
Chinese perspective, North Korea became a forgotten kingdom, and China didn’t provide 
any help to North Korea in spite of the formidable famine and economic troubles occurred 
during the late 1990s.      
During the first term of Hu’s era, all variables ameliorating Korea-China relationship 
continues to be positive. Korea-China still enjoyed a honeymoon period in spite of a short 
clash over the “Garlic trade” in 2000. After the second North Korea nuclear crisis erupted in 
2002, Roh government of Korea helped China prevent from facing international isolation 
because both Korea and China had similar policy priorities on the Korean peninsula to keep 
peace and stability, while surviving Kim Jung Il’s regime. The second nuclear crisis certainly 
influenced Sino-North Korean relations, facilitating the adjustment of China’s North Korean 
policy orientation from the traditional alliance-like relations to a normal state-to-state 
relation. Ironically, North Korea became the most important agenda for Chinese foreign 
policy.   
During the second term of Hu’s era, China’s Korea policies have rather changed in a 
negative way to Korea. Although the pillar of China’s Korea policy has maintained the 
previous equidistance policy, China gradually adopted more positive and active engagement 
policy toward North Korea. A considerable distrust against Lee government of Korea has 
also strained Korea-China relations although they established a “strategic cooperative  
                                                          
10 See more details on variables (Kim, 2008b). 
11 See (Lee, 2000:206-215); (Chung and Im, 2003:235-39). 
12 Regarding the priority of Hu’s foreign policy, see (Jin, 2006:35-48). 
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Table 2. Variables in China’s Making Korea Policy 
Post-Cold War 
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partnership” in 2008. China seemed to believe that Lee’s North Korea policies were based 
upon the belief that North Korea would collapse, which is against the strategic interests of 
China. Furthermore, growing frictions and disputes between China and the U.S after the U.S 
declaring the “pivot to Asia” policies increased the strategic value of North Korea and 
brought more tension in the bilateral relations between Lee’s Korea and China. Upon the 
new challenges, China is in search of its new foreign policies with a scent of turbulence.13 In 
the meantime, ambivalent attitudes on the Korean peninsula in the Chinese foreign policy 
complicated the Chinese objectives laid out in a mixture of strategic and short-term interests.  
 
3.2. Diversified Chinese Strategic Thinking  
 
According to various surveys, writings, and interviews in China, changing perceptions 
and diversified strategic ideas on the two Koreas have been observed. Along with its 
economic rise, strategic ideas in China have also evolved and become diversified. Therefore, 
it is misleading if one believes that Chinese strategic thinking on the Korean peninsula is 
monolithic. Furthermore, a top-down approach to Chinese decision-making is likely to cause 
a misunderstanding of Chinese foreign policy. Chinese strategic thinking has become 
diversified, according to how they perceive China’s international status. Three groups of 
Chinese thinkers can be identified depending on their perceptions on China’s status in the 
world. These three schools are identified as the ‘traditional geopolitical school’ which 
include chauvinistic nationalists, the ‘developing country school,’ and the ‘newly rising great 
power school.’  
The characteristic of China’s foreign policy during the Jiang Zemin era (1989-2002) is 
                                                          
13 Regarding the turbulence of China’s foreign policy, see (Kim, 2012a:33-50). 




best described by the “hide capacities and bide time (taoguangyanghui: 韜光養晦)” principle, 
the core idea of the ‘developing country diplomacy school.’ However, reflecting China’s 
growing national capacity, the strategic policy during the Hu Jintao era (2002-present) has 
gradually changed into the attitude of “being able to accomplish something (yousuozuowei: 
有所作爲),” the main idea of the ‘newly rising to great power school.’ China under Hu Jintao 
took a more active foreign policy in pursuit of international status of a ‘great power’. When 
the second North Korean nuclear crisis occurred at the early stage of Hu’s succession to 
power, Hu’s China rejected the previous position of ‘hesitant intervention policy’ to external 
affairs. Instead, it took up a more active role as a mediator and established a solid 
international image as a ‘responsible great power’ by successfully launching the Six-party 
talks. Furthermore, growing confidence of China after the financial crisis during the period 
of 2008~09 allowed Chinese foreign policy to cross the Rubicon. The principle of 
“taoguangyanghui” would no longer be a guide line of Chinese foreign policy in the future. 
Traditionalists regard North Korea as a buffer zone and a strategic asset to counter the 
bilateral alliance mechanism in Northeast Asia. Traditionalist hawks argue that China must 
consider North Korea one of its important allies to prevent U.S. hegemony; hence, China will  
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Source: Revised version of the [Table 1] in Kim, Heungkyu. 2010. “From a Buffer Zone to a Strategic 
Burden: Evolving Sino-North Korea Relations during Hu Jintao Era.” The Korean Journal of Defense 
Analysis 22(1) 
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take measures to strengthen its “special ties” with the reclusive regime. Accordingly, this 
group regards Korea as a hostile state allied with the U.S. to counter China. 
Although the contexts are a bit different, a summary titled “Keeping an Eye on an Unruly 
Neighbor,” written by Bonnie Glaser, Scott Snyder, and John Park, was influenced by such 
thoughts, regarding Chinese intervention in North Korean territory: 
 
“If the international community did not react in a timely manner as internal order in North 
Korea deteriorated rapidly, China would seek to take the initiative in restoring stability.”14 
 
Developing country school holds that despite some differences between China and the 
U.S., they favor sound relations with the U.S., looking at the relationship with Korea in the 
context of constructing sound Sino-U.S. relations. They have created a major line of Chinese 
foreign policy during Jiang Zemin’s and still in Hu Jintao’s eras, taking the pragmatic 
approach mainly featured in the “hide capacities and bide time” principle. Based upon such 
recognition, they support affirming China’s foreign policy goal to establish peaceful relations 
with neighboring states including Korea as well as great powers for the purpose of continued 
economic development (at least) until 2020, when a “medium-level of well-being society (小
康社會)” will be reached. In this line of ideas, they sought to transform the relationship with 
North Korea into a normal state-to-state relationship.   
The “newly rising great power school” regards China as a rising great power, second to 
the U.S., and feels that Chinese may collide head-on with the U.S. The ideas of this group 
are gradually gaining popularity among the Chinese populace and elites in the 17th party 
Congress even before the financial crisis. On the Korean peninsula, they are likely to favor 
playing a more active role as a great power in the region in dealing with the issue, as well as 
in preserving its interests on the Korean peninsula. They are likely to oppose unilateral 
intervention in North Korea either by the U.S. or Korea. 
The evolving strategic thinking of China will certainly influence their Korea policies and 
the future relations between Korea and China. Given the circumstance, China is likely to 
maintain its current equidistance policy to the two Koreas during the first term of Xi 
Jingping’s era. However, Korea-China relationship is not necessarily rosy and may face 
serious challenges. There is flaring nationalism with the rise of the “great power school”. 
China may face difficulties in controlling domestic pressures over its foreign policies.  
In the middle of intensifying US-China competitions, China may find a strategic value of 
North Korea. Unsettled power configuration in Northeast Asia as a result of recent China’s 
rapid rise is likely to increase the strategic value of North Korea. The first major foreign 
policy adjustment of Xi Jinping, Chinese leader of the 5th generation, is likely to recover its 
relationship with North Korea. China also needs to have batter relationship with North Korea 
to manage its disruptive behaviors and prevent the North Korea from being a variable in the 
US-China relations.  
Domestic factors such as more actors in foreign policy-making with uncoordinated 
behaviors, unclear foreign policy vision, power transition, China’s decision-making style 
contributed to a conservative policy on Korea policies. Increasing influence of Chinese 
nationalism on foreign policy might have a negative impact upon a sound Korea policy. 
China may enter a period of turbulence in its foreign policy orientation during the last half of 
2010s. Accordingly, predicting Chinese responses to North Korea issues will become more 
                                                          
14 See the Summary part of (Glaser, Snyder, and Park, 2008). 




difficult. In reality, such conditions above mentioned may reduce the scope of flexibility and 
creativity, and deter constructive visions in Chinese foreign policy, which may be 
detrimental to Korea’s interests. As a result, we may face North Korea with nuclear weapons. 
Consequences that follow would be increasing mutual distrust, arms race, and more chaotic 
security situation in this region for a long, long time to settle down.   
 
3.3. Recognition of Korea’s Strategic Importance 
 
In 2004, China became Korea’s largest trading partner, while Korea ranked as China’s 
third largest. This increase of mutual interdependence and the collaboration on North Korean 
nuclear issues meant the emergence of the “Korea factor” as an important element in China’s 
foreign policy toward the Korean Peninsula. Even if this variable may not be a decisive one, 
it will increasingly influence China’s policy toward North Korea.  
The North Korean nuclear crisis enhanced Korea’s strategic importance. If Korea had not 
supported China’s policy, Beijing would have faced a difficult situation in the international 
process to resolve the North Korean question. Throughout the nuclear crisis, Korea has 
continued to provide aid to the North along with China, and sided with China in dissuading 
other countries from taking military action against North Korea as its policy priority focuses 
on maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. If China had been the only 
country to provide aid to the North, the country might have faced international censure for 
abandoning the global norm and resorting to Cold War behavior of socialist solidarity. 
Apprehension about China would have spread in the international community. 
Korea did not accept the “security cooperation” concept for East Asia and the “value 
diplomacy” proposed by the conservative Japanese government, intended to link the United 
States, Japan, Australia, and India based on their common democratic values. Korea’s non-
interest helped foil the move which, if materialized, could have isolated China. During Hu 
Jintao’s visit in 2006, Seoul recognized China’s market status to successfully becoming one 
of a few of the world’s industrialized nations to do so. 
The report to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 
2007 noted that “the international situation has entered a stage of great upheavals and 
readjustments, and the world is in a very unstable condition.” Such a statement must be 
applicable to the situation in Northeast Asia. Under these circumstances, China continues to 
recognize Korea’s strategic importance in view of the instability caused by North Korea. 
President Hu said, in a congratulatory message to President Lee Myung-bak, that “the 
Chinese government highly regards relations with Korea and gives high priority to 
diplomacy with Korea.” 
In the future, several factors such as increasing signs of instability in the North Korean 
government, an increasingly unreliable North Korean attitude toward China, the necessity to 
cooperate with Korea in the event of Korean unification, and the realignment of Northeast 
Asian security architecture following Korean unification may keep the strategic importance 
of Korea a high priority in China’s Foreign Policy.  
However, China is not likely to take any initiative on Korean Peninsula issues, including 
North Korea’s nuclear issues, given the historical backgrounds, strategic interests, and power 
configuration between the U.S. and China, and the evolving schools of thought in China’s 
foreign policy. China will probably pay attention most to changing regional security 
situations, placing the fate of Korean peninsula on a lengthy cycle of power transition; in 
particular, China will pay special attention to US policies. Neither the US nor China is likely 
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to back down although they certainly do not want overall crashes at all.  
 
 
4. KOREA’S CHINA POLICY OPTIONS 
 
Korea’s foreign policy will be influenced by the regional configuration of international 
relations; most importantly by power transition between the U.S. and China. Korea would be 
left with no alternative but to work closely with both the United States and China as 
illustrated in the table 4. Both the U.S. and China have respective roles, capacities and the 
will to intervene in Korean issues, including the North Korean nuclear crisis.15 Given the 
circumstances, Korea’s China policy orientations vary according to the power transition in 
East Asia as well as in the world: from “Allying with the U.S & Communicating with China 
well (聯美通中)”, to “Allying with the U.S & Harmonizing with China (聯美和中),” to 
“Allying with the U.S & Cooperating with China (聯美協中),” and to “Concerting with the 
U.S. and China (聯美聯中).” The policy orientations are not necessarily linear, which will be 
influenced by changing the U.S-China relations.    
Under the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons and military provocations, the Korea-
US alliance must be the pillar for Korea’s security architecture for the next coming decades. 
However, given the rise of China, Korea’s foreign policy should be more complicated and 
multi-dimensional, seeking co-operation from neighboring countries. Korean must work with 
China to harvest fruits from China’s economic development, to promote further cooperation 
on North Korea and to maintain peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.16 
The subtlety and complexity of evolving the US-China relations would be a great 
challenge for Korea. Korea must constantly prepare for the future transformation of regional 
politics. Then Korea should be able to respond to it accordingly. Without such dynamic 
policy preparation, Korea is likely to fail to draw a positive outcome from kaleidoscopic 
changes in this region.  
In the next decade, the U.S.-China relationship becomes much more complex, hard to 
read the subtlety of such relations. Korea needs to analyze carefully the situation from 
multiple and strategic standpoints. It needs to formulate measures to avoid alienation from 
Korean peninsula issues as a result of US-China strategic cooperation or consortium. It also 
needs to issue a strong message that it would be the failure of the US/China foreign policy if 
it forces Korea to choose either.    
As a middle power, Korea cannot play a balancing role in this regional power configuration. 
However, Korea may have a bridging role by promoting further cooperation, initiating a new 
cooperative mechanism, and seeking to mitigate tension between/among great powers in this 
region. However, we are fully aware that it will be difficult to achieve stability, prosperity, 
and peace alone. Establishing a middle-power cooperative mechanism is required. Middle 
powers in this region face a similar international milieu and can promote common interests 
through establishing such a middle-power cooperative mechanism. 
With strong economic interdependence as a foundation, Korea would work to broaden 
the scope of its political, social, cultural and military relations with China in order to  
                                                          
15 Although Korea’s mediating role between the two great powers is not an easy task, should more 
positive circumstances arise, such a role should not be excluded. See (Wang, 2005:39-48). 
16 For the need for a framework to maintain stability in the Korean peninsula, see (Goodby, 2006); 
(Sigal, 2006:30-52); (Yeo, 2006:53-65).  




Table 4. Korea’s Policy Options17 
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cultivate mutual trust between the two countries. Bilateral relations must be enhanced on all 
fronts so as significantly to weaken the causal link between the aforementioned issues of 
potential discord and mutual animosity. 
A careful review of the evolution of China’s intention and capabilities regarding Korea is 
also necessary. This would involve an accurate understanding of China’s strategic objectives, 
degree of military readiness, sustainability of its economic growth, domestic challenges and, 
finally, China’s strategic thinking vís-a-vís the changing political-security climate on the 
Korean peninsula and East Asia region as a whole. In achieving this understanding, Korea 
should neither exaggerate nor underestimate China’s goals, capabilities and possible roles in 
the region. In this process, it is critical to keep in mind that Korea should cooperate with 
regional middle powers as much as possible.  
 
                                                          
17 Regarding the other version of scenarios (Kim, 2008: 13). 





Since the formal establishment of Korea-China relations in 1992, the bilateral 
relationship has recorded tremendous successes in terms of trade volume, cooperation on the 
North Korean nuclear crisis, and the number of exchanges in various areas. However, it is 
also true that the bilateral relations still remain far from satisfaction in terms of depth and 
degree of communication, crisis management, and a shared vision. Given Korean’s 
psychological alertness and apprehension formed over a long history of contacts with China, 
differences in political system, mutual misperceptions and lack of understanding, these 
problems cast serious challenges for improved future relations between the two countries.   
Korea needs to exercise a “creative middle power-pragmatic diplomacy” in dealing with 
China. The objective is to establish a positive-sum game in the Korea-China strategic 
partnership, extending beyond security issues on the Korean Peninsula. Both the Korea-U.S. 
alliance and the Korea-China strategic cooperative partnership should be the foundation of 
Korea’s diplomatic assets, under which Korea would try to persuade North Korea to abandon 
its nuclear program. 
Pragmatic policy focuses on results without adhering to moral absolutism, the so-called 
“value diplomacy.” The aim should be the establishment of cooperative and mutually 
prosperous relations. Creative diplomacy avoids confining China in a fixed concept and takes 
an imaginative approach considering the trajectories and uncertainties of Chinese diplomacy. 
In this approach, strategic management capabilities are more emphasized than strategic 
planning. 
Conflicts and competition between China and Japan as well as the US and China, 
resulting from the “pivot to Asia” policy and Chinese aggression, may prove to be 
continuously destabilizing factors in the region despite their tremendous level of economic 
interdependence and globalization.18  However, China is a state in the process of trans-
formation. Predicting the future of China according to a fixed standard risks losing sight of 
reality. It is necessary to maintain a strategic alertness so that Korea can adjust its policies to 
the changes taking place in this region. China is already a neighbor that cannot be rejected or 
avoided on the basis of good or bad. Korea should try to establish complex, multifaceted, and 
full-fledged cooperative relations with China through close communication and mutual 
understanding.  
The substance of Korea’s relations with China will be determined by the policies of each 
government to consolidate the “cooperative strategic partnership.” Sound communication, 
political will, and strategic management matter. The future relationship of Korea with China 
is at the crossroad among the ranges of being enemy, homager, or equal partner. Korea 
obviously favors the establishment of an equal partnership with China, based upon the 
common principles of mutual respect, cooperation, and co-prosperity as others probably do 
so. 
 




                                                          
18 Regarding the analysis of such rapprochement, see (Kim, 2008). 
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